Evidence to the EFRA Select Committee Inquiry from CRAGG

EFRA Parliamentary Inquiry into Flooding 2020
These are the views of the Cumbria Rivers Authority Governance Group (CRAGG).

CRAGG was formed by the many concerned flood groups, parishes and farmers of Cumbria following the destruction and paralysis caused by Storm Desmond in December 2015. Its purpose is to convey a community voice on all flooding issues across both town and country for the wettest county in England. Cumbria contains both concentrated areas of urban population, including Kendal and Carlisle as well as a wide distribution of smaller settlements, sparsely located with often vulnerable infrastructure. The region is subject to very high intensities of rainfall with significant groundwater and fluvial flooding and water storage issues. The county is formed into 3 main, but not exclusive, catchments for the principal rivers of the Eden (north and east), the Derwent (north and west) and the Kent/Leven (south) and each catchment is equally represented within the CRAGG committee structure sharing experience, knowledge, ideas and as a critical friend to the risk management agencies principally the EA and Cumbria County Council. The extent of the devastation caused by „Desmond‟ and its continuing long term effects is included here for information as an appendix.

CRAGG supplied written and verbal witness evidence to the EFRA Select Committee on 7 February 2017 https://drive.google.com/file/d/17PqIpmxYT-V7xFRgBH1BrO4_Q5v9nsku/view and have engaged with Flood Ministers, Stewart and Coffey, as well as the 6 sitting County Members of Parliament over the previous 5 years.

Members of the CRAGG Committee are strongly represented on the Cumbria Strategic Flood Partnership (CSFP) now under the independent chairmanship of Richard Denyer. By its very nature a partnership covers a wealth of views on the subject such that consensus can be difficult to balance particularly in view of the difficulties presented for representatives of the risk management authorities who are caught in a potential conflict of interest so the Chair has asked CRAGG to forward its comments as the community view residing within the partnership as this may help the committee by being more direct and insightful and also reflective of community being constitutionally at the centre of all that the CSFP does.

It is unfortunate that the call for evidence deadline earlier in the year (the 6 questions) was missed largely due to the disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. We are, therefore, grateful for this second opportunity to contribute. It may be apparent that our comments and advice cover aspects of the earlier questions to some degree.

By the current submission we do not seek to replace any of the evidence previously supplied but to add to it by focusing on the answers to the questions over which the EFRA committee seeks guidance. Ideally the two should be read together.

Q.1 How effectively do the Government policy statement and the Environment Agency strategy meet the challenge posed by a changing climate?

We feel it is important that the Select Committee advances a broader investigation as to the purpose and ambition of the new Environment Agency (EA) Strategy and Government Policy Statement and resists the populist temptation to be drawn into debate centred primarily upon climate change. The effects of climate change are, of course, extremely important, however, there appears a very real risk of Government being blinkered into addressing only future rainfall and sea level scenarios and lose sight of the other current fundamental issues it overlays, namely the lessons to be learnt from the history of flooding, both over time, living memory and beyond and an appraisal of the performance of the Agency, currently, and over the preceding 20 years. This can only benefit understanding and frame climate change effects in a more accurate context.

There appears to us to be two matters of primary concern – the way the EA is structured and its current approach to flood risk management which is essential to be acknowledged and included within its strategy.

EA Structure

The governance structure is not acceptable in its current form.

There is a strong impression, when dealing with the EA, that its role as „Environment Regulator‟ is its dominant core activity with „flood alleviation‟ a bolt-on side issue. DEFRA policy is stated as the protection of „people, property and the environment‟ in that order, however, the reality of outcomes via the EA shows a clear visible path of operation suggesting the priorities follow „environment, property and, only then, people‟. People and communities can be justified in feeling that they are the endangered species!

The EA is the river „Regulator,‟ „owner‟ of £20+ billion of flood assets, „overseer‟ of an additional £20+ billion 3rd party flood assets and „managers‟ of flood risk. To be an owner, regulator, overseer and manager removes the agency from effective criticism and effective governance which is fundamentally an unacceptable constitutional position to adopt. Added to flood risk being secondary to the environmental core role we see the outcome in ineffective flood management, a biased or tainted commentary on self-performance and a significant „blocker‟ to direct Treasury funding justification.

In terms of the funding structure there remains considerable concern at the wording and application of the criteria as set out in the „Green Book‟. Even where viable and beneficial, the potential for action is often closed off by the difficulty to forecast acceptable monetary value by spend proportion ratio in a short term return. Water and river management takes decades and even centuries to understand, tune and maintain so the current funding formula model is considered unfit for purpose and largely devoid of long term understanding leading inevitably to conflict with communities who have better local knowledge and are generally

and understandably critical of short-termist input. Although Government has recognised this to some extent by introducing some recent amendments to the formulae these, whilst welcome, are small and not fundamental. The EA should be overtly stating their difficulties in this regard so society and community can put their case openly without fear of misrepresentation or subjugation and thereby truly guide Government.

EA Approach to Flood Risk

The EA‟s 2020 Strategy for England (NFCMS p.12) sets out its long term vision as “a nation ready for, and resilient to, flooding and coastal change – today, tomorrow and to the year 2100”. It proposes to do this via 3 ambitions namely, creating climate resilient places, creating climate resilient infrastructure and ensuring local people can respond and adapt to risk. We must ask, therefore, where within this laudable vision and ambition is the undertaking to ensure our river and water systems are maintained at maximum efficiency? The document, by this omission, implies this is already the case but local commentators and observers across the country will attest this is definitely not the current position. There appears instead an acceptance on the part of the Agency and other RMA‟s that flooding is not preventable but to be protected from and to be made resilient to. Some floods cannot be avoided but some can and most can be reduced in severity with attention to river management of confluence timing (speeding or slowing flows for optimum conveyance with lower river peaks) together with channel and flood plain maintenance.

We do not yet have a joined-up strategy encompassing weather forecasting, groundwater flows, and capacity/timing within the fluvial system. The EA instinctively, it seems, focuses on flooded locations as target points for spend not whole catchments where problems largely originate. Flood risk is not managed from source by reactive capital projects at disaster sites. Flood risk should be managed as a continuous process not just works initiated in the fistful of years following a major event. It is quite apparent to us that the EA is not funded, geared or appropriately focused and mandated.

The EFRA interview of the EA‟s Chair, Chief Executive and Director of Flood Risk on 14 July has highlighted the degree of the flawed approach with too much front end loading toward climate change. For example, when asked about „maintenance‟ all three made reference only to the maintenance of flood risk assets and neither broached a concept of „maintaining rivers‟ themselves. It is the maintenance of the channel, banks and flood plain, particularly at fixed locations such as bridges and river bends where historically catchpits were used to annually evacuate obstruction to conveyance of gravels and sediment. The abandonment of this practice by the EA, notably on environmental grounds, has led to research (Water 2020, 12(5), 1355; https://doi.org/10.3390/w12051355) which now shows that it is not practicable to conceive of a river as a „natural‟ entity as all rivers are to a greater or lesser extent engineered by essential and historical infrastructure and such engineering accumulates deposition caused by erosion over and above that conveyed through the system confirming that river maintenance is not a matter of choice but an essential activity deserved of a suitably proportioned regular maintenance budget.

There is a heavy reliance on modeling in regard to justifying expenditure via the current cost benefit analysis approach. Whilst modeling has improved significantly in recent years it is not yet so reliable as to be a single justified source of decision making yet this does appear to be common practice. “The Model” is often taken in precedence to local advice and overriding historical evidence and does not fit well with the advantages of co-production methods given its binary nature and the inability to easily independently question and verify.

Q.2 Are the current national and local governance and co-ordination arrangements for flood and coastal risk management in England effective?

Our views on the EA Strategy - structure and approach - to flood risk, highlighted in the answer to question 1, are also relevant in response to this question so these points are not repeated here.

CRAGG is not directly involved with event response taking the view that resilience and protection at the doorstep represents a degree of failure on a wider scale and we therefore concentrate primarily upon flood prevention.

Coordination and guidance from weather forecasting for Cumbria is far from ideal. With only a temporary radar station at St Bees (no longer operational) there is heavy reliance upon information via Northern Ireland and radar in other countries (Eire and Norway). The distance involved magnifies the degree of judgment and guess work required to an unreasonable degree. This lack of knowledge gets the whole system off on potentially the wrong foot as the topography of the catchments mean they are highly susceptible to even small variations in rainfall intensity where rain falling on one side of a fell provides vastly different river characteristics to it falling on the other.

The aspects of the lakes and reservoirs require to be coordinated very carefully and this appears to occur more by luck than judgment with United Utilities (water supply) operating to different criteria than the EA (flood protection). Earlier this year storms Ciara and Dennis slipped by Cumbria and created havoc elsewhere. Were it not for this „stroke of luck‟ the high rainfall for this summer period, recorded at the Honister rainfall gauge, the result could have been far worse. Fortunately Crummock Water was at draught report level and had absorbed and buffered some estimated 5.2 million cubic metres of water before the control sluice and wave wall were inundated to an overtop depth of 0.6 metre. If the reservoir had been at normal operational level, Cockermouth and the river Derwent communities would have been inundated once again with devastating consequences. It is evident that legislative input into the remit of water providers and water protectors requires better coordination.

Partnership working between all the RMA‟s and communities offers significant opportunities of moving toward an ideal co-production means of coordinating flood risk. The Catchment Management Groups, now Partnerships, were intended to do this however their remit and funding limits this to flood risk via NFM methods only so a valuable opportunity to map all risk and coordinate its management using all „tools in the box‟ is not currently realised.

The Cumbria Strategic Flood Partnership, widened and strengthened by Rory Stewart when Floods Minister after storm Desmond, is a valuable opportunity for RMA‟s in dialogue with communities and other affected organisations to move co-production forward. Whilst the willingness appears to be in place the requirement for adequate funding appears currently elusive. We have to question how serious Government is to address the flooding issue if such organisations which lever in significant voluntary input are not supported. It is strongly recommended that this initiative is looked at in detail by the EFRA Committee for its merit and ability to involve significant expertise at local level in both historic and professional perspectives.

We have further concerns similar to climate change blinkering basic river maintenance out of the picture. Natural Flood Management (NFM) in many quarters is perceived to be the answer to many difficult questions. Just like climate change NFM has significant importance however what it offers has been widely over exaggerated to the point where some see it as the only way forward. Indeed one has to be extremely concerned that a senior politician can seriously advocate the ability of introducing Beavers to our rivers to favorably influence flood risk. This may be an extreme example but the small scale effects and time scale required are very limiting – this is not to say that NFM does not merit inclusion in a holistic strategy but its role and capability need to be better understood.

Upon the NFM point above we draw attention to the new EA Strategy changing the language used. NFM, for example, has become „Nature Based Solutions‟. It is probably not helpful, particularly where the community is concerned, to keep changing language and terminology. There appears no positive reason for this and simply sounds „new‟ when in fact nothing has greatly changed.

Q.3 What level of investment will be required in future in order to effectively manage flood risk in England, and how can this best be targeted?

An international comparison can provide a reference point to the scale of funding required. The Netherlands spend 7bn euros whereas the UK spend £1bn per annum (from 2021). At the same time the Netherlands works to a higher level of protection, namely between 1 in 250 and 1 in 10,000 compared to the UK at 1 in 100. Add to this the country size, population and length of coastline by comparison then the EA strategy, which includes an undertaking

to become a world leader to better protect current and future generations, (FCRMS p.16) will require a significant lift to its budget to meet such an aspiration.

The economic cost of flooding was estimated by the Government some time ago at £2.2bn per annum (Foresight Future Flooding, UK Government 2004). Since then summer flooding in the UK has been reported as costing £3.9bn in 2007 (EA report “Estimating the economic cost of the 2015/16 winter floods”), Storm Desmond and associated storms cost £5.8bn in 2015 (K.P.M.G.) and winter flooding in 2019/20 has cost £0.5bn (Association of British Insurers). In addition the Thames Tidal Barrage is coming to the end of its design life in 2030. Although its life can be extended, a replacement barrage for London will probably take 30 years from design brief to project delivery at an estimated cost of £20 - £30bn. (£20bn at 2007 prices). As a result a new barrage for London will absorb the entire current UK flood defence budget for 30 years!

In order to estimate what might be a reasonable level of funding in the UK we first need to consider the „business as usual‟ (BAU) scale of flooding before adding the additional effects of future climate change. BAU flooding is artificially low because of a lack of understanding of historical flooding. Met Office data sets are reset if there is a change in the scientific methodology or equipment used. Hence continuous rainfall data only covers from generally 1910 and back to 1863 in some cases. Headlines in the media referring to „highest rainfall ever‟ refer to these dates. For Cumbria a historical view of the rainfall gauge data available from the 18th Century gives a very different overview of the regularity and scale of flooding (Barker et al – „A 200 year precipitation index for the central English Lake District‟ – Hydrological series 49(5) Oct 2004 and also Watkins et al – „Extreme flood events in upland catchments in Cumbria since 1600: the evidence of historical records‟ – North West Geography Vol8. No.1, 2008) and offers more clarity on what the EA terms such as 1 in a 100 year flood event really means in practice. We are sure similar data can be similarly sourced for other areas of the country to provide more clarity on the true scale of historical flooding.

Additional investment will be required to cover climate change with two elements:

1. A calculated figure from modeling for the linear effects of climate change.
2. A further sum (% of 1) to cover what climate scientists refer to as „tipping points‟ where the climate behaves in a non-linear fashion and the effects are unknowable

with current knowledge.

The scale of investment in reducing flood risk needs to match the scale of the economic cost of frequent flooding. It is irresponsible not to invest to significantly reduce this cost. From all the above it would appear a figure of more that £3bn per annum is required.

Whereas priority will be vested in the larger urban areas and locations at high risk, particularly as regards essential infrastructure there is a danger that quick wins and small scale actions that would be highly beneficial to smaller settlements will continue to be overlooked. Investment for catchment works must be ring fenced to ensure such projects can be initiated perhaps linking to the planning system by creating catchment „improvement

areas‟ for delivery by local catchment management groups within independent river boards responsible for flood risk reduction across the whole river catchment.

Q.4 How can communities most effectively be involved and supported, in the policies and decisions that affect them?

We believe the best approach for community involvement is to use the co-production of knowledge approach (Landstrom et al „Coproducing flood risk knowledge: redistributing expertise in crucial participatory modelling‟ – Environment and Planning A 2011, vol 43, p1617 – 1633) as attempted at Pickering, and within a catchment management context. Fundamental to this approach is an open and honest dialogue with RMA‟s prepared to be respectful of community views. Our experience in Cumbria since Storm Desmond has not always been positive. There have been many occasions where an insidious barrier of institutional authoritarianism has surfaced blighting some dealings with RMAs. Unless such occurrences can be tempered valuable local knowledge and experience will be lost.

Returning briefly to the answer to question 1, the EA as regulator, owner, overseer and mangers of flood risk have had nearly 20 years with outright control of all decision making and it is understandable that a new system with roots in the Water Act that requires critical justification, accountability and open communication takes time to adopt and there will be lapses to the more deterministic operations of old. Community can be cynical, non- compliant and critical but much of this negativity will have cause and can be harnessed into positivity with understanding and positive action.

An example is the EA „working together to adopt to a changing climate – evidence review‟ document earlier this year which, on one level appeared very promising as it seems the external researchers signposted that the co-production of knowledge approach as the best way forward. However, from engagement with the EA national community engagement team in Bristol it was apparent that community management featured higher than genuine engagement. There appeared shock and surprise at a community view that consultation of issues of abandonment or „adaptation‟ were viewed as wholly unacceptable without prior underpinning by equity replacement before publication. In short, too often community feels they are not discussing the matters that affect them with the actual decision makers – this needs to change.

We fundamentally believe that a catchment management approach should include a community role. Unfortunately in Cumbria recently matters appear to now be, to a degree, in reverse. After Storm Desmond the intervention of the then floods minister, Rory Stewart, saw the county set up into 3 catchment groups each with an EA appointed catchment director. Five years further on, the catchment directors have gone, the catchment groups passed to „Rivers Trusts‟ and these trusts operate without recognition of a full role in flood alleviation and mitigation only projects involving NFM are accepted as these currently attract Government funding with a low, 1:1 ratio of anticipated success even if the calculated

methodology is largely, as yet, unscientifically based. When questioned why an integrated catchment approach to flooding cannot be undertaken we are told that this is „too complicated‟ and costly to initiate. The EA has returned to the piecemeal project based capital approach uninformed by the whole catchment ethos.

Q.5 With increasing focus on natural flood management measures, how should future agricultural and environmental policies be focused and integrated with the Government’s wider approach to flood risk?

The effectiveness of Natural Flood Management (NFM) or, as the EA Strategy now refers to it, „Nature Based Solutions‟ has to be proven first before it can be incorporated into agricultural and environmental policy. NFM is still at the research stage especially in relation to large scale events, yet it is being implemented funded by Government grant application and without full understanding of the consequences. If it is to be incorporated successfully it needs to be part of a whole catchment approach so that it can form a part of a catchment risk alleviation strategy and programme. There are places where „slow the flow‟ is required but equally places where the water should be increased in speed to alleviate confluence peak conflicts – doing the wrong thing at the wrong place or time will simply increase not decrease risk. Farm payments could be used to encourage farmers to store water on their land, re-meander rivers and plant trees (correct species) but all should be where they are scientifically found to be appropriate.

ELMs offer a good opportunity to change the picture, however, the promise of co-production discourse has not materialized and valuable experience in the community is being largely ignored. There are risks that some interpretations back re-wilding or even abandonment and a belief that NFM is being pushed not for its original title but as an opportunity for the funding of habitat improvement.

NFM is of limited value if it does not have the opportunity to, at least, naturally, or preferably, manually, draw down, recharge and reinstate water capacity. We need a whole catchment approach as highlighted in the EFRA report of 2016/17 but this is still not in full action. We need a recognition that initiatives with safe conveyance rates away from flood areas hold the key and their maintenance should become mandatory.

Well farmed land manages water. Soil moisture deficit denotes porosity in the soil, dry land can absorb water, saturated land cannot and produces high rates of damaging run-off.

CRAGG is a member of ADA and is following with interest the DEFRA Pilots with the demaining authorisation process in mind for the management of gravels and river bank works.

Q.6 How can housing and other development be made more resilient to flooding, and what role can be played by measures such as insurance, suitable drainage and planning policy?

The NPPF requires a total review to take account of flooding issues. Local plans are being approved based solely on the balance of opinion of the EA as statutory consultees, planning authorities defer to the EA as “experts”. The EA appears to lack the capacity to undertake this role expeditiously. Schemes to develop on flood plains are not being opposed by the EA if they benefit from defences yet defence failure represents a high risk policy.

Development pressure is increasingly focused on flood plains as it is easier and cheaper to build than on brown land alternatives. Government needs to:

.

1. Urgently incentivise brown land outside flood plains as these are truly the only sustainable sites.

2. Insisting upon SuDs requirements on flood plains is futile – a wet sponge cannot accommodate any more water.

3. Incentivise flood friendly development to negate a need for SuDs where this is not practicable.

4. Launch equity reserve packages in conjunction with the insurance industry for existing properties prone to repeat flooding to:

   1. Assist owner occupiers relocate and augment a rental sector, and

   2. Facilitate improvement schemes to upgrade to „flood friendly‟ standards.

5. De-combining foul and surface water drainage will become increasingly necessary and the Local Authorities concerned will require significant financial assistance to set such programmes in place.

6. Provide funding assistance for development to move away from flood plain locations or to re-build/adapt to be flood friendly.

Of more concern to surface water issues on flood plains is foul drainage. Pumped non- return sealed systems should be mandatory for settlement and processing on land clear of

flood risk. Local authorities and water utility companies need to work on flood safe infrastructure before schemes can be consented.

Q.7 What lessons can be learned from the recent winter floods about the way Government and local authorities respond to flooding events?

Perhaps the starkest lesson to be learnt is that the lessons from 2005, 2009 and 2015 have not been processed sufficiently to see very much favourable progress. After 5 years of dealing with RMAs, particularly the EA, the final implementation of projects initiated after Desmond in 2015 have been truncated down to a cluster of spot projects which belies original promise. National Policy of whole catchment integrated management has been patently ignored by way of strict adherence to the „Green Book Cost Benefit Analysis‟. Indeed, we have to conclude „Economic Benefit‟ overrides „protection of people‟ as a DEFRA Policy.

We take one example, Carlisle, as an illustration but this scheme is by no way unique. The Carlisle scheme is divided into 3 phases roughly based upon geographical points of flood protection failure, these are Melbourne Park, The A7 Eden Bridge and Willowholme.

The phase 1 project is a classic example of utilising informal defence structures to save the expense of a properly designed asset. The design work following the 2005 Carlisle flood was found to be flawed with levels of protection set at different probability such that when Desmond struck flood water out-flanked the new defences and filled a protected area of some 2000 houses with water up to 6ft deep – flood water was corralled into the area intended to be defended. Melbourne Park is a large green space through which a river flows. The only outlet for the river is a „pinch point‟ flat beam bridge built in 1930‟s replacing an arched bridge to flatten the main road to improve transport conveyance. As a result it is very low and constricted. The bridge is of concrete construction and originally had open baluster decorative parapets. Following flooding in the 1960‟s these parapet openings were filled with blockwork – the road and parapet had become a flood restriction and reliance was being placed upon a structure never designed for the purpose. It must have been apparent after the 2005 Carlisle floods (1600 houses) that the parapet was compromised as a flood defence and in the event of parapet failure the result would be a „catastrophic event‟. The term catastrophic in „safety speak‟ relates to multiple loss of life, extensive damage to property and extensive damage to the environment, in that order. Work was planned to strengthen and waterproof the bridge parapet as part of the 2005 flood scheme, however, it was only implemented in 2016 – after the Desmond flood! Water was witnessed shooting through gaps in the blockwork. A very near miss for a catrostrophic event. So, in reality, National Policy in action puts the protection of people very low on its priority list to be one of the last works implementations 11 years after the event and of the highest order of risk. Classifications by way of safety, consequence and probability is patently ignored in favour of „economic viability‟ imposed by the HM Treasury „Green Book‟ policy.

In this particular case „consequence‟ is rated as „high risk‟ by virtue of two fatalities in 2005 (one direct drowning, the other indirect, trapped and passed away due to hypothermia). „Probability‟ is rated also „high risk‟ by virtue of the bridge and its parapet being integrated into the current post Desmond phase 1 scheme as a fundamental element in the flood defence asset. In the event of the bridge and/or parapet failure resulting in further „loss of life‟ it seems the „project team‟ does not appreciate the matter of liability. It must be emphasised that throughout the five years of dealing with the EA there has been no notice taken of such liability, presumably upon the basis that they are covered by consultants commissioned to design the works. It is not a defense to be aware of such risks and simply pass them on. The EA lost its „Crown Immunity‟ in 2007 for the Corporate manslaughter and Homicide Act a point made clear to the project team by CRAGG member, Carlisle Flood Action Group, during co-production knowledge sessions but reliance upon the parapet remains and, in addition, evidence supplied to the EA that the bridge structure itself moved and vibrated during the Desmond flood and the police organized evacuations of the immediate area appears to have not prompted a re-think.

Similar issues have arisen in Phase 2 of the Carlisle project. The main A7 Eden Bridge, a 5 arch major bridge with gravity stone arches to half, dating from 1815, with a stone faced concrete widening from the 1930‟s had all arches filled during the flood but for the top 300mm at the keystones. The bridge was closed for 2 weeks as a structural precaution. Phase 2 was publicised as involving the removals of accumulated gravels from the arches and spits of deposits upstream and downstream along with bank „smoothing‟ all to improve and speed conveyance to lower the River Eden storm peak. Not so publicised is that all this work has been abandoned upon the basis that the “model” suggests it will make no difference. It is very hard to see how a major flood „pinch point‟ which collects rainfall from 2,500 sq km of the wettest county can simply be left to silt up.

In summary, the whole business of formal Flood Risk Management can be seen to be disregarded in favour of Economic Compliance and regulatory process in preference to formal „Safety of People and Property‟.

Members of CRAGG would welcome the opportunity to formally give evidence in front of your EFRA Select Committee.

Paul Barnes
Chair
Cumbria Rivers Authority Governance Group

John L Kelsall
BArch, DipArch, MA, RIBA, MRTPI, FRSA Cumbria Rivers Authority Governance Group

Appendix

A brief review of the disruption and destruction in Cumbria caused by floods in December 2015.

Storm Desmond was not a „one-off‟; Cumbria suffers from repeat flooding. As in many preceding decades, extreme rainfall events in 2005, 2007, 2009 and February 2020 were of a similar magnitude, but largely by luck the flood results were felt less widely within Cumbria‟s borders, though no less catastrophically in the specific locations where peak flows coincided. On the particular communities and settlements, the impacts felt from these events in the recent past were often as great, or greater, than in 2015, though it should be acknowledged that in the case of 2020 luck was assisted by flood defence work undertaken in the previous 4 years, and by extensive preparation by the Risk Management Agencies.

The response to Storm Desmond (root of the largest December 2015 flood) required the mobilisation of a huge medley of specialist assets and personnel. It is testament to the professionalism of these personnel and to the sensible, pragmatic and altruistic reactions of individuals and communities throughout the county that only one life was lost directly to the storm‟s effects. Even as people were still being rescued from their homes, Cumbria‟s resilience partners began planning for the recovery challenge, (with responsibility) transitioning to the Strategic Recovery Coordination Group (SRCG) chaired by Cumbria County Council on10 December, with the principal objective: “Working with local communities to restore Cumbria to normality” Despite this success, the Cumbria Local Resilience Forum (CLRF) took the need to learn lessons from the way the response had been coordinated very seriously. A debrief report (Deeming & Otley, see above) was commissioned, and made a total of 82 recommendations for improving multi-agency working (some quoted in this response. All were accepted by CLRF. ... All stakeholders in the recovery process appear to have tried to act as efficiently and effectively as they could in order to enable communities‟ recovery. Despite this, (the report found that) bureaucracy at local and national levels did act to hinder some recovery activity. This included difficulties with the interpretation of grant scheme rules, and difference in their application between the four affected districts of Cumbria.

On occasion this generated a reputation risk to local authorities and other agencies. (But) the review also identified many examples of notable

practice across all levels of coordination. These included the provision by government of a block grant for infrastructure repair. This allowed the Infrastructure sub-group to implement a massive repair programme more efficiently than would ever have been possible if projects had been funded on a case-by-case basis, whereas the Environment sub-group were required to conduct case-by-case repair assessments for individual assets (reinstating 64 foot-bridges, repairing 102 paths and replacing 56 gates and stiles), even though it was EU funding and the amounts were much smaller. The fact that each assessment had to be validated by the Rural Payments Agency left the impression within the group that they were not trusted to quantify these costs accurately themselves. (The Report) also reveals the sometimes systemic (e.g. austerity-based) barriers that acted to slow other aspects of recovery. Using this rich data stream, (it built) recommendations that reflect and integrate multiple perspectives; from formal agencies and authorities, the third and business sectors and from communities and affected individuals.

Cumbria is the most sparsely populated county in England with a lengthy narrow country road network. Smaller communities can be difficult to reach across often old stone bridges (over 1600), some destroyed by Desmond, and many more out of action for some time, leaving many individuals vulnerable to isolation and injury and with significant increase in mortality risk. Emergency services struggle to cover such a wide geographical area effectively, leaving many communities at risk of being cut off and extremely vulnerable. If flooding occurs over such a wide area, resources are used up quickly, targeting those communities affected first and more densely populated areas such as main towns, leaving smaller communities at risk of fending for themselves